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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This bankruptcy appeal presents a question with 
potentially far-reaching implications for the States' 
administration of their criminal justice systems. It is also 
one of first impression in this Circuit. The issue is whether 
the debt to a State of a bond surety for a defendant who 
fails to appear is dischargeable in the surety's Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. We decide the question here only in the 
context of the case before us: The bond surety is a relative 
of the non-appearing defendant. 
 
We conclude that the decision of the District Court, 
holding such a debt dischargeable, contradicts the plain 
meaning of the applicable statute. In light of the problems 
that such a holding might inflict upon the functioning of 





David Nam (David), the son of the debtor, Gi Nam (Nam), 
was charged in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on September 
22, 1997, with a number of offenses, including murder, 
robbery and burglary in connection with the shooting death 
of Anthony Schroeder during a March 1997 robbery. Bail 
was set at $1 million, conditioned on a 10% cash payment 
by the surety and an agreement by the defendant and the 
surety to assume legal responsibility for paying the full 
amount of the bail to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
By a Certification of Bail and Discharge, dated January 12, 
1998, executed by both Nam and David, Nam agreed to 
serve as surety for the bail. The operative portion of the 
Certification reads as follows: 
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       WE THE UNDERSIGNED, defendant and surety, our 
       successors, heirs and assigns, are jointly and severally 
       bound to pay the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 
       the sum of ONE MILLION dollars ($1,000,000). WE are 
       bound by the CONDITIONS of this bond as shown on 
       both sides of this form. 
 
Pursuant to the terms of the bond, both Nam and David 
agreed that the latter would appear in court at all required 
times and that Nam, as surety, would notify the court in 
writing of any change in David's address. The Certification 
also states, "If defendant performs the conditions as set 
forth herein, then this bond is to be void, otherwise the 
same shall remain in full force and this bond in the full 
sum thereof shall be forfeited." Additionally, both Nam and 
David authorized the entry of a judgment by confession 
against them in the amount of the bond, regardless of 
whether a default of the bond conditions occurred. 
 
On March 12, 1998, David Nam failed to appear in court 
for a pre-trial status listing in his criminal case. 
Consequently, on April 6, 1998, the Court of Common Pleas 
of Philadelphia, Criminal Section, ordered the bail bond 
forfeited pursuant to the terms of the bond agreement, the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, and local court 
rules.1 The criminal court entered a judgment against Nam 
as surety on the forfeited bond in the amount of the bail, 
plus court costs: $1,000,018.50.2 The notice of entry of 
judgment against Nam, which bears the caption of David's 
criminal case, reads in pertinent part: 
 
       Bail in the amount of $1000000.00 has been sued out 
       and judgment entered in the amount of $1000018.50 
       including cost of $18.50 due to failure of the above 
       named defendant to appear for trial on 3/12/98 in 
       Room 604 CJC 1301 Filbert St. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 4016(A)(2)(a); Rule 510A of the Philadelphia Court 
Rules for the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas. 
 
2. Given that Nam had initially posted $100,000, or 10% of the total bail, 
in cash, it is not clear why the court did not enter a judgment in the 
amount of $900,018.50. That question, however, is not before this Court 
and we do not address it. 
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       You may reduce your financial responsibility by 
       producing the defendant forthwith and filing a petition 
       with the Clerk of Quarter Sessions to vacate, in total or 
       in part, the judgment against you. 
 
When David was released on bond, Nam provided him 
with living quarters and the necessities of life. Some time 
before his pre-trial status hearing, David fled to South 
Korea where his paternal grandmother resides. It appears 
that, once David had fled to Korea, Nam followed him there 
and paid a lawyer $10,000 to represent David. See Krasny 
v. Gi and Yeoung Nam, 245 B.R. 216, 220, 225-26 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2000). Indeed, Nam testified at a S 341 creditors 
hearing before the trustee on August 9, 1999, that he had 
provided David with such assistance. See id. at 220.3 David 
remains a fugitive. 
 
On May 19, 1999, Nam petitioned for bankruptcy under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Nam listed the City of 
Philadelphia as the creditor on a claim in the amount of 
$1,045,000, arising from the bail bond security. On August 
27, 1999, the City of Philadelphia filed a Complaint in 
Adversary, alleging that, although Nam had listed the bail 
bond judgment as an "unsecured non-priority claim" in the 
schedule he had filed in the bankruptcy case, such debt 
was not in fact dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
S 523(a)(7). On September 2, 1999, Nam filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), 
arguing that the bail bond debt was dischargeable. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because these facts concerning Nam's possible collusion with his son 
are not part of the record in the instant case, we do not rely upon them 
in deciding this appeal. Indeed, it follows as a matter of law from our 
holding here that we need not reach the question whether Nam has 
aided his son and thereby engaged in `wrongdoing' sufficient to forfeit 
his 
right to seek dischargeability under the District Court's rule. 
Nevertheless, we include this information here to illustrate the 
difficulty 
of administering a rule such as the one formulated by the District Court 
that would make the wrongdoing of the debtor dispositive of the question 
of dischargeability. See Sections II and IV.A, infra. Indeed, given Nam's 
colorable misconduct, it would seem that the District Court misapplied 
the rule in the very case in which it announced it. 
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Bankruptcy Judge granted Nam's motion to dismiss 
on December 8, 1999. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the 
City's arguments that the judgment against Nam satisfied 
the elements of S 523(a)(7) and that forfeited bail bonds 
must be exempted from discharge in order to safeguard the 
integrity of the bail and criminal justice systems. The court 
construed S 523(a)(7) narrowly, holding that it only exempts 
from discharge "obligations imposed upon the debtor as 
punishment for his wrongdoing" and that the judgment 
against Nam arose "because a condition of the bond was 
breached and not because the surety is being punished." 
 
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's 
judgment, holding that S 523(a)(7) excepts from discharge 
only sanctions that are penal, as opposed to civil, in nature 
and that result from the debtor's own wrongdoing. The 
District Court further found that Nam never assumed any 
independent obligation to produce David in court and, 
thus, that Nam committed no wrongdoing. Consequently, 
the court held the debt dischargeable. Moreover, the 
District Court enunciated a more general proposition 
concerning the application of S 523(a)(7): A judgment 
against a surety, arising from a forfeited bail bond, will be 
exempted from discharge under S 523(a)(7) only if the 
surety played some affirmative role in the defendant's 




The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under Title 11 of 
the United States Code, 28 U.S.C. S 1334(b), as a complaint 
to determine the dischargeability of a debt. The District 
Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(a) and 
we have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(c) and 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise plenary review 
over a district court's bankruptcy decision. Commonwealth 
of Pa. Dept. of Environmental Resources v. Tri-State Clinical 
Laboratories, Inc., 187 F.3d 685, 687 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 





A. SECTION 523(a)(7) 
 
The sole statutory provision at issue in this appeal is the 
exception to discharge provided by 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(7), 
which states in pertinent part: 
 
       (a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does 
       not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (7) to the extent such debt is for a [1] fine, penalty, or 
       forfeiture [2] payable to and for the benefit of a 
       governmental unit, and [3] is not compensation for 
       actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty. . .. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(7) (emendations added). In order to 
"determine whether [a debt] is dischargeable under 
S 523(a)(7), we must determine whether [such] debt meets 
the three requirements of the section." In re Rashid, 210 
F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2000). Here, the parties do not 
dispute that Nam's debt is payable to and for the benefit of 
a governmental unit (either or both the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania and the City of Philadelphia) or that the $1 
million bail bond debt is not compensation for any 
pecuniary loss by such governmental entities or any other 
party.4 Consequently, we need only concern ourselves with 
the construction of the first prong of S 523(a)(7): the "fine, 
penalty or forfeiture" provision. The City argues that Nam's 
debt is a "forfeiture" of the bond amount arising from 
David's failure to appear and, therefore, falls within the 
plain language of the statute. Nam on the other hand 
contends that the statute only creates an exception for 
"penal" debts, a category into which Nam's debt assertedly 
does not fall. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As the District Court correctly noted, the $18.50 in costs might be 
regarded as compensation for a pecuniary loss on the part of the court 
system. In what follows, we assume that is so, and confine our 
discussion to the remaining $1 million (arguably as reduced by the 
$100,000 that Nam has already paid). See District Court opinion at note 
10; note 2, supra. 
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Following the teaching of the Supreme Court, we have 
held that the "starting point of any statutory analysis is the 
language of the statute itself." Commonwealth of Pa. Dept. 
of Environmental Resources v. Tri-State Clinical Laboratories, 
Inc., 178 F.3d 685, 688 (3d Cir. 1999), citing Pa. Dept. of 
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990); 
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986). Consequently, 
our analysis of the "fine, penalty or forfeiture" prong of 
S 523(a)(7) must begin with the plain language of the 
statute. 
 
On its face, the judgment against Nam seems to come 
within the plain meaning of the term "forfeiture." For 
example, "forfeiture" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as 
"a divestiture of specific property without compensation; 
. . . [a] deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence 
of the nonperformance of some obligation or condition." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th Ed. 1990). "Forfeiture" is 
defined by Webster's Dictionary as "the divesting of the 
ownership of particular property of a person on account of 
the breach of a legal duty and without any compensation to 
him: the loss of property or money on account of one's 
breach of the terms of an agreement, bond, or other legal 
obligation." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(1971). Clearly, the judgment against Nam arose from 
David's nonperformance of his obligation to appear in court 
and Nam's breach of his duty to produce David for trial. 
Moreover, the judgment5 does not compensate the City for 
any pecuniary loss suffered but instead serves as an 
incentive to the surety to prevent the defendant's flight and 
to produce him insofar as the surety is capable. 
 
The District Court, however, attempted to construe 
S 523(a)(7) using traditional canons of construction. We find 
that this attempt at construction results in fact in writing 
the term "forfeiture" out of the statute. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we note that the District Court's 
conclusion that a forfeiture must be "penal" in order to 
come within the exception conflicts with the plain language 
of the statute. Nothing in that language equates a forfeiture 
with a penalty. Quite the contrary, "penalty" and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Excluding the $18.50 in court fees. See notes 2 and 4, supra. 
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"forfeiture" are two distinct terms within the phrase "fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture." Citing Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 
(1986) and In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924 (4th Cir. 1999), the 
District Court reasoned that S 523(a)(7) excepts from 
dischargeability only those forfeitures which are"penal 
sanctions that result from the debtor's wrongdoing." 
Finding no such qualification in S 523(a)(7), we disagree 
with the District Court's reasoning. We do not interpret 
Kelly to imply that the "fine, penalty or forfeiture" prong of 
S 523(a)(7) is restricted in scope to except from 
dischargeability only obligations of a penal nature. 
Furthermore, to the extent the Fourth Circuit so interpreted 
Kelly in In re Collins, we decline to adopt a similar rule 
here. 
 
The Kelly court addressed the question whether 
"restitution obligations, imposed as conditions of probation 
in state criminal proceedings, are dischargeable in 
proceedings under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code." 
Kelly, 479 U.S. at 38. The Supreme Court held that such 
restitution obligations, although not excepted expressly by 
S 523(a)(7), fall within the S 523(a)(7) exception and, 
therefore, are not dischargable. See id. at 53. The Supreme 
Court based this holding on findings that (1) S 523(a)(7) 
"creates a broad exception for all penal sanctions" and (2) 
restitution obligations such as the one at issue in Kelly 
constitute "penal sanctions." Id. at 51-53. Kelly, therefore, 
stands for the proposition that S 523(a)(7) excepts from 
dischargeability some penal sanctions that technically are 
neither fines nor penalties nor forfeitures. However, it does 
not follow logically from this proposition thatS 523(a)(7) 
excepts only sanctions of a penal nature. 
 
The Kelly court addressed the penal nature of restitution 
obligations and the history, object and policy ofS 523(a)(7) 
because the plain language of that statute fails to address 
"restitution obligations" expressly. The instant appeal is 
distinguishable from Kelly insofar as "forfeitures" -- the 
type of obligation alleged to be at issue -- are excepted 
expressly from discharge by S 523(a)(7). Because S 523(a)(7) 
expressly excepts forfeitures without regard to penal 
nature, we need not address this characteristic in assessing 
the applicability of S 523(a)(7) to Nam's alleged forfeiture. 
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Returning to the District Court's use of the canons of 
statutory construction, we find its reliance on the canon 
ejusdem generis to lead to an erroneous interpretation of 
the statute. According to that canon, "where general words 
follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the 
general words are construed to embrace only objects 
similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the 
preceding specific words." United States v. Weadon, 145 
F.3d 158, 160 (3d Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, the District 
Court's attempt to render "forfeiture" a more general term 
than "penalty" is strained and unconvincing. The 
alternative dictionary definitions of "forfeiture" which the 
District Court cites span varying degrees of generality. 
Although Black's Dictionary characterizes"forfeiture" as a 
"comprehensive term," it also defines it as a"divestiture of 
specific property" -- language which resembles that 
dictionary's alternative definitions of "penalty" in both its 
broadness and its specificity; "penalty" is an"elastic term 
with many different shades of meaning" but is nevertheless 
"generally confined to pecuniary punishment." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 650, 1133 (6th ed. 1990). 
 
It is not necessary to make here the numerous similar 
observations possible with respect to the dictionary 
definition of "fine"; it suffices merely to note that the 
generality of the terms in question cannot be ascertained 
with any reliability on the basis of their dictionary 
definitions and that it is difficult to discern any lexical 
justification for the assertion that "forfeiture" is a more 
general term than "penalty." It follows that the canon 
ejusdem generis is inapplicable to this case. Moreover, even 
were it applicable, it could not be used to reach the result 
of the District Court -- the transformation of the term 
"forfeiture" into surplusage -- because ejusdem generis 
"cannot be employed to render general words meaningless." 
Ferrara & DeMercurio, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 169 
F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 1999), quoting United States v. Alpers, 
338 U.S. 680, 682 (1950). 
 
Similarly flawed is the District Court's application of the 
maxim noscitur a sociis to subsume the term"forfeiture" 
within the earlier term "penalty." The Supreme Court has 
stated that "[t]he maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is 
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known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable 
rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of 
many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended 
breadth to Acts of Congress." Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. 
DeMatteis/MacGregor JV, 209 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2000), 
quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 
(1961). Put differently, the maxim provides that the 
meaning of an ambiguous statutory term may be derived 
from the meaning of the accompanying terms. In re 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Were the maxim applicable here, it would indeed be 
possible to hold that the term "forfeiture" should be read as 
"penal forfeiture" in light of the term's proximity to the word 
"penalty." S 523(a)(7). However, noscitur a sociis can have 
no application in this context because "[w]hen Congress 
has separated terms with the conjunction `or,' it is 
presumed that Congress intended to give the terms`their 
separate, normal meanings.' " In re Continental Airlines, 932 
F.2d at 288, quoting Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 
72 (1984). Consequently, we are again referred to the plain 
meaning of the term "forfeiture" which, as we have 
indicated supra, encompasses debts such as Nam's. 
 
B. STATE LAW CONTEXT AND HISTORY 
 
As is often the case, such an analysis of the "plain 
meaning" of the statutory language in a vacuum, while 
helpful, cannot of itself provide an adequate guide to the 
proper construction of the statute. To buttress the 
preceding discussion, we now turn to the state-law context 
of S 523(a)(7) and its history. As Nam points out in his 
appellate brief, absent explicit Congressional intent to 
incorporate state law, the meaning of a term in a federal 
statute is a question of federal law. See In re Wilson, 252 
B.R. 739, 742-43 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000); accord In re 
Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1900) (federal law 
determines dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(5)). 
Nevertheless, this fact does not render the characterization 
of debts such as Nam's under applicable state law wholly 
without meaning. Although the label that state law affixes 
to a certain type of debt cannot of itself be determinative of 
the debt's character for purposes of the federal 
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dischargeability provisions, such state-law designations are 
at least helpful to courts in determining the generic nature 
of such debts under the law that most directly governs their 
creation, e.g., whether they are penal or civil, fines or 
forfeitures. 
 
In the case of Nam's debt, Pennsylvania law defines a 
judgment entered against a surety as a result of his failure 
to produce the defendant in court as a "forfeiture." Rule 
4016 (A)(2)(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, entitled "forfeiture," authorizes the bail authority 
to "order the case or other security forfeited" as a sanction 
for the defendant's violation of a condition of the bail bond. 
Local court rules also use the term "forfeiture"; Rule 510A 
of the Philadelphia Court Rules for the Criminal Division of 
the Court of Common Pleas authorizes the court to order 
bail to be "forfeited" when the defendant fails to appear for 
court and states that the surety is obligated to produce the 
defendant at all required court appearances "under penalty 
of forfeiture of his bail bond." Consequently, the District 
Court correctly conceded that the $1 million judgment 
against Nam is characterized as a forfeiture under state 
law. 
 
The history of S 523(a)(7) strongly suggests that Congress 
intended the sort of forfeiture entered against Nam to come 
within the exemption from dischargeability set forth in that 
section. Section 523(a)(7) came into being in 1978, when 
Congress enacted the present Bankruptcy Code. The 
parties to this litigation do not dispute that, in enacting the 
Code, Congress codified case law exempting certain 
penalties and forfeitures from discharge under the former 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Moreover, such codified case law 
included a line of authority holding that obligations against 
sureties arising from forfeited bail bonds were 
nondischargeable. In what follows, we will review the 
fundamental historical rationale for and the development of 
S 523(a)(7) against the background of the prior 1898 Act 
case law from which that statute emerged. 
 
In general, a discharge granted to a debtor in a Chapter 
7 bankruptcy proceeding voids all judgments previously 
applicable to the debtor, except for debts that are exempt 
from discharge under 11 U.S.C. S 523, which"expresses 
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Congressional policy that certain debts should be excluded 
from discharge because of overriding public policy relating 
to the type of the debt, the manner in which liability for it 
was incurred, or the underlying social responsibility that 
it represents." Bankruptcy Service, Lawyers Edition, 
Ch. 27: Code 523, S 27:4 at 27-90 (West 1999). Such 
"[d]ischargeability exceptions reflect a decision by Congress 
to allow certain competing public interests to override the 
`fresh start' purpose of bankruptcy." Id . As the Supreme 
Court has stated, "Congress evidently concluded that the 
creditors' interest in recovering full payment of debts in 
[the] categories [encompassed by S 523(a)] outweighed the 
debtors' interest in a complete fresh start." Grogan v. 
Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). 
 
Although the 1898 Act contained no provision specifically 
forbidding the discharge of fines, penalties, or forfeitures 
due the government, it did provide that certain types of 
debts were nondischargeable. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 
SS 17, 63 (repealed 1978). Pursuant to S 57j of the 1898 
Act, penalties or forfeitures owed to the government were 
only allowed as a claim in bankruptcy to the limited extent 
that such penalties or forfeitures compensated the 
government for a pecuniary loss. Section 57j provided: 
 
       Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a 
       district, or a municipality as a penalty or forfeiture 
       shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the 
       pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or 
       proceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose. 
 
30 Stat. 561, 11 U.S.C. S 93 (repealed 1978). 
 
It is evident then that in enacting this provision, 
Congress intended to protect general creditors against the 
reduction of debts owed them by limiting the debts 
allowable to the government to its actual pecuniary losses. 
A leading treatise on bankruptcy explained the policy 
considerations underlying S 57j in the following terms: 
 
       It is perfectly conceivable that a bankruptcy law is 
       anxious not to curtail this sovereign power to mete out 
       punishment and therefore treats claims for penalties 
       on a footing of equality with, if not of precedence over, 
       other claims. Yet there is on the other hand the natural 
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       tendency and task of the bankruptcy law to mitigate as 
       far as possible the losses to be sustained by creditors, 
       and under this aspect there is an undeniable equity in 
       the postulate that participation in the estate should be 
       denied to a creditor who has neither in some degree 
       contributed to the distributable funds (e.g., by the 
       governmental protection on which taxation is supposed 
       to be based), nor has suffered a pecuniary loss by 
       parting with something in money's worth. It is this 
       consideration for the bankrupt's creditors that 
       pervades S 57j. 
 
3 Collier on Bankruptcy, P 57.22[1], at p. 382 (14th ed. 
1977). 
 
The notion that the conflicting interests of protecting the 
government's power to punish and defending the rights of 
general creditors should be thus balanced is a recurring 
theme of the case law under the 1898 Act. See, e.g., 
Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 40 (1962) (stating that 
S 57j "plainly manifests a congressional purpose to bar all 
claims of any kind against a bankrupt except those based 
on a `pecuniary' loss. So understood, this section, which 
has been a part of the Bankruptcy Act since its enactment 
in 1898, is in keeping with the broad aim of the Act to 
provide for the conservation of the estates of insolvents 
. . . ."); Goggin v. United States, 140 F.Supp. 557, 560 (Ct. 
of Claims 1956) ("[w]hen Congress, in [S57j], drew a 
distinction between a penalty of forfeiture, on the one hand, 
and the pecuniary loss sustained, on the other, we think it 
meant that an arbitrarily set amount . . . should not be put 
in competition with the claims of the ordinary creditors of 
the bankrupt."), vacated on other grounds, 152 F.Supp. 78 
(Ct. of Claims 1957). 
 
Thus, under pre-1978 bankruptcy statutes and judicial 
decisions, penalties and forfeitures owed to the government 
were, for the most part, not allowed as claims. The 
correlative question whether such debts should be 
dischargeable was firmly settled by the judiciary long before 
the enactment of the Code in 1978. Because penalties and 
forfeitures owed to the government were essentially not 
allowable, courts generally exempted them from discharge 
as a way of holding debtors responsible for such penalties 
 
                                14 
 
 
and forfeitures while avoiding interference with the results 
of state criminal proceedings. See United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 245 (1989); Kelly, 479 U.S. at 
44-47; Tri-State Clinical Laboratories, 178 F.3d at 695. As 
the Kelly Court stated, "[d]espite the clear statutory 
language, most courts refused to allow a discharge in 
bankruptcy to affect the judgment of a state criminal 
court." Kelly, 479 U.S. at 45. This principle of 
nondischargeability of penalties and forfeitures payable to 
the government and not in remuneration of a pecuniary 
loss was so "uniformly accepted" by 1978 that Congress 
incorporated it into the Code as an explicit statutory 
exception to dischargeability in S 523(a)(7). Ron Pair, 489 
U.S. at 245 n.8; Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44-46, quoting 1A Collier 
on Bankruptcy P 17.13, at 1609-10 & n.10 (14th ed. 1978); 
id. at 51 (recognizing that S 523(a)(7)"codified the judicially 
created exception to discharge for fines [, penalties and 
forfeitures]"). 
 
C. CASE LAW 
 
The line of authority underlying this judicially-created 
exception is an old and venerable one, stretching back to 
the turn of the twentieth century. In In re Caponigri, 193 F. 
291, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), Judge Learned Hand addressed 
the issue whether a claim of the United States on a forfeited 
recognizance for bail in a criminal case, asserted against a 
debtor who had acted as surety for a defendant who fled, 
was allowable, given that it constituted a penalty or 
forfeiture under former S 57j.  Significantly, in Caponigri, as 
in the instant case, the debtor was a surety for the criminal 
defendant and not the defendant himself. Judge Hand held 
that "the recovery on a recognizance for bail is essentially 
the recovery of a penalty, and is a forfeiture." 193 F. at 292. 
Judge Hand adhered to the concept of a penalty being by 
definition unrelated to any pecuniary loss; the amount of a 
penal obligation, he wrote, "is measured neither by the 
obligee's loss nor by the valuation placed by him upon what 
he has given in exchange." Id. 
 
In the years that followed, Caponigri came to be viewed as 
controlling authority on the question of the allowability of 
forfeited bail bonds. See, e.g., In re Lake, 22 Am. Bankr. 
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N.S. 168 (F. Ref. Minn. 1932). More significantly, however, 
the Caponigri decision provided an analytical framework for 
defining debts. This framework was applied to determine 
the allowability of types of penalties and forfeitures other 
than bail bonds. Many cases applied Judge Hand's penalty 
test to find obligations to be disallowed where the 
obligations were imposed for coercive or regulatory 
purposes and were not proportionate to any actual 
pecuniary loss. See, e.g., In re James Butler Grocery Co., 22 
F.Supp. 993, 994-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1938); In re Erlin Manor 
Nursing Home, Inc., 36 B.R. 672, 678-79 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1984); In re Idak Corp., 19 B.R. 765, 772-75 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1982). 
 
Moreover, the reasoning of Caponigri was applied to 
dischargeability as well as to allowability. As early as 1914, 
a court in New York held that claims by governments 
against sureties for judgments on forfeited bail bonds were 
nondischargeable under the 1898 Act. See In re Weber, 212 
N.Y. 290, 106 N.E. 58 (1914). See also Commonwealth v. 
McMillen, 1 Ky. Rptr. 270 (Ct. of Appeals of Ky. 1880) 
(accord). In Weber, the debtor sought the discharge of a 
judgment entered against him on a forfeited bail bond. 
Following Judge Hand's decision in Caponigri, the court 
found the obligation not to be allowable. See Weber, 212 
N.Y. at 291-92, 106 N.E. at 59. The court went further, 
however, ruling that because the obligation was not 
allowable, it was also not dischargeable: "It could not have 
been intended by the Bankruptcy Act that a bankrupt 
should be discharged of the payment of a debt which was 
not allowable." Id. 
 
Both factually6 and legally, Weber is on all fours with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The opinion does not make clear whether the debtor was the criminal 
defendant or a surety for another. Nevertheless, the Weber Court's 
wholesale adoption of Judge Hand's analysis in Caponigri suggests that 
the cases were factually identical. Additionally, at least one bankruptcy 
treatise suggests that the debtor in Weber was in fact a surety. See 
Harold Remington, A Treatise on the Bankruptcy Law of the United 
States, vol. 8, S 3304 at 156 (6th ed. 1956) (citing Weber as authority 
for 
the proposition that "[j]udgment against the bondsman on an appearance 
bond in a criminal case, forfeiting the bond, is . .. not dischargeable") 
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instant case. Moreover, the parties to this appeal agree, and 
the Supreme Court instructed in Kelly, that cases under 
the 1898 Act, relating to the dischargeability of certain 
fines, forfeitures and penalties, comprise part of the 
judicially-created body of exceptions that Congress codified 
in S 523(a)(7), and therefore guide courts' dispositions of 
such cases. As the District Court stated, "courts 
interpreting the present Bankruptcy Code have referred to 
the practices under the Act of 1898 that preceded it, and in 
construing provisions of the Code that were codifications of 
earlier judge-made law, as S 523(a)(7) evidently was, courts 
interpret the codification to match the prior judge-made law 
absent evidence of specific intent that it be interpreted 
otherwise, see Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44, 47." District Court 
Opinion at 18 n.19. Nevertheless, the District Court failed 
to follow this teaching insofar as it entirely ignored Weber, 
notwithstanding the City's heavy reliance on that case in its 
reply brief. 
 
The District Court sought to explain its refusal to rely 
upon pre-Code jurisprudence with the assertion that 
practice relating to the dischargeability question at issue 
was "mixed" during that period.This view is b ased upon a 
single case, United States v. Hawkins, 20 F.2d 539 (S.D. 
Cal. 1927). Hawkins, however, conflicts with all other 
judicial and scholarly authority which recognizes the 
exception to dischargeability for penalties and forfeitures -- 
an exception which the District Court itself acknowledged 
as axiomatic in its opinion.7 Given that Hawkins is a 
summary opinion of only two paragraphs, bereft of analysis 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(emphasis added). Regardless of identity of the debtor in Weber, however, 
that decision still governs the instant case because of the broad scope of 
its underlying rationale: "It could not have been intended by the 
Bankruptcy Act that a bankrupt should be discharged of the payment of 
a debt which was not allowable." Weber, 212 N.Y. at 291-92, 106 N.E. 
at 59. 
 
7. See In Re: Gi Nam, 254 B.R. 834, 846 n.25 (E.D. Pa 2000) (noting 
"pre-Code judicial practices by which courts found that judgments of 
state criminal courts were not discharged in bankruptcy despite that the 
strict application of the letter of the Act of 1898 would have discharged 
them" (citing Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44-48)). 
 
                                17 
 
 
and lacking any references to Caponigri, Weber, McMillen, 
or the judicially-created exception to dischargeability for 
penalties and forfeitures, it is virtually worthless as a 
precedent.8 Even if we could properly rely on Hawkins, the 
decision by its terms stands only for a very narrow 
proposition not directly applicable here: S 17 of the 1898 
Act provides no exception whatever to dischargeability for 
penalties and forfeitures. We conclude that the District 
Court erred in relying on Hawkins for the proposition that 
pre Code practice concerning the dischargeability of 
penalties and forfeitures was "mixed." 
 
D. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The clarity and weight of the judicial authority discussed 
supra are great enough that such authority provides a 
sufficient basis for deciding this appeal. Nevertheless, the 
implications of this case for the administration of justice 
are potentially of such a magnitude that it is necessary to 
devote more than passing attention to the public policy 
considerations underlying the dischargeability question. 
These issues range from socioeconomic equity to the ability 
of the several States to administer their justice systems. 
 
First and foremost among these policy concerns is the 
issue of socioeconomic fairness. Let us return to some 
critical facts presented by this case -- facts emphasized by 
neither party to this litigation. Here, Nam, the father of the 
fugitive defendant, had sufficient means to pay $100,000 in 
cash and to assure payment of the remaining $900,000 in 
the event of forfeiture. As the Pennsylvania District 
Attorneys Association points out in its amicus brief, the 
parents and relatives of the typical accused felon in 
Philadelphia, who is more likely than not economically 
disadvantaged, do not have such resources at their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Bankruptcy Court here recognized the limited usefulness of 
Hawkins, noting that the "court's decision in United States v. Hawkins 
. . . consists of only two paragraphs. The court simply held that none of 
the four exceptions to discharge listed in S 17 of the Act covered the 
debt 
of a surety on a bail bond. It did not analyze whether the words `fine, 
penalty or forfeiture' cover a surety's obligation on a bail bond." In Re: 
Gi 
Nam, 255 B.R. at 155 n.7. 
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command. The average defendant is forced to remain in jail 
while awaiting trial, all but certainly experiencing far poorer 
living conditions than the defendant free on bail. At least 
one bankruptcy court has discussed this danger: 
 
       Eventually, freedom on bail would be restricted to 
       those defendants who could pay cash up front, i.e., 
       wealthy defendants only. Poor and middle class 
       defendants would be forced to languish in overcrowded 
       jails. [Among t]he end results would be . . . inequitable 
       discrimination against those defendants not fortunate 
       enough to possess thousands of dollars in ready cash. 
 
In re: Bean, 66 B.R. 454, 457 (Bankr. D.Colo. 1986). The 
District Court's decision, therefore, opens the door to 
accusations that the Philadelphia justice system treats the 
wealthy and the poor differently. 
 
Also of concern are the implications of the District 
Court's decision for principles of federalism and comity that 
must be respected in order to insure the proper functioning 
of the several States' justice systems. In Kelly , the Supreme 
Court stated that "we must consider the language of S 523 
in light of the history of bankruptcy court deference to 
criminal judgments and in light of the interests of the 
States in unfettered administration of their criminal justice 
systems." Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43-44. Throughout its opinion, 
the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the significant 
deference due to state criminal proceedings in the context 
of federal bankruptcy law. Discussing S 523, the Court 
wrote, "[o]ur interpretation of the [Bankruptcy] code also 
must reflect the basis for this judicial exception, a deep 
conviction that federal bankruptcy courts should not 
invalidate the results of state criminal proceedings." Id. at 
49 (citation omitted). The District Court's opinion fails to 
take account of these important considerations, and, 
insofar as its decision in favor of Nam sanctions the use of 
federal bankruptcy laws to evade the financial 
consequences of noncompliance with Pennsylvania's bail 
system, it constitutes the very sort of federal interference 
with a State's administration of justice which the Supreme 
Court condemned in Kelly. 
 
The course that the District Court urges entails not only 
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relatively abstract problems such as these, but also 
potentially grave concrete consequences for the States' 
administration of their respective criminal justice systems 
and the proper functioning of the bail system. In terms of 
a basic behavioral incentive analysis, the rule that the 
District Court proposes would throw into doubt the viability 
of the current bail system by creating perverse incentives 
for sureties who are also relatives of the defendant, as well 
as for such defendants themselves. Once a criminal 
defendant becomes convinced that his relative will be able 
to escape financial responsibility (other than the negative, 
albeit temporary and comparatively lesser, consequences of 
the bankruptcy filing itself) for the bail amount if the 
defendant flees, the incentive to appear for trial diminishes 
sharply. Similarly, given that the surety would no longer 
face a sizable debt should the defendant flee (again, leaving 
aside the consequences of a bankruptcy), the surety would 
no longer be deterred from assisting the defendant in his 
flight. This is a particularly serious risk in cases, such as 
the Nams', in which the criminal defendant faces execution. 
Many a father might consider the opportunity to purchase 
his son's life at the cost of enduring a bankruptcy 
proceeding to be an attractive bargain.9  
 
The States' bail systems are "central to our modern 
criminal procedure"; any threat to their efficacy and 
integrity damages the States' criminal justice systems. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Of course, these concerns do not come into play when a professional 
bail bondsman acts as surety for a criminal defendant. In such cases, 
the professional bondsman is not inherently interested in helping the 
defendant avoid punishment; nor is the defendant likely troubled by the 
impact of his actions on the bondsman's finances. Professional 
bondsmen are compensated in advance through fees for the risk that the 
defendant will flee; consequently, the forfeiture of a bail bond is, from 
the perspective of the bondsman, merely an anticipated cost of doing 
business. See In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924, 932 (4th Cir. 1999). 
Nevertheless, the instant case does not present, and we therefore do not 
address ourselves to, the question of professional sureties. For that 
reason, we find both Collins and the recent Fifth Circuit decision in In 
re 
Hickman, 260 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001) inapplicable to the case at bar in 
part because those cases involved commercial bail bondsmen. It should 
be noted that many jurisdictions, including Philadelphia, do not provide 
for professional bondsmen. 
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re: Bean, 66 B.R. at 456-57; see Commonwealth v. 
Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 335-36, 296 A.2d 829, 834 35 
(1972) (discussing purpose and importance of bail system); 
Ruckinger v. Weicht, 356 Pa. Super. 455, 457, 514 A.2d 
948, 949 (1986) (same). Were we to permit the rule that the 
District Court proposes, the effectiveness of the bail system 
would be reduced because the risk of flight by criminal 
defendants released on bail under bonds executed by 
nonprofessional sureties would increase. The adverse 
consequences of the proposed rule are obvious. They 
include hampering the States' ability to prosecute criminal 
defendants, thereby increasing the danger such persons 
pose to the public; imposing increased costs on the States 
for locating and capturing fugitives; increasing the costs of 
pre-trial detention for defendants who otherwise would be 
released on bail; and exacerbating the already serious 
problem of overcrowding in detention facilities. Such costs, 
however "difficult to quantify," are, contrary to the District 




For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the decision of 
the District Court and remand this case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We hold that, in 
light of the statute's plain language, its history, and 
applicable case law, 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(7) does not except 
from discharge in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy a bail bond 
forfeiture judgment entered against a family surety for 
failure to produce the defendant for trial. 
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